Suarez identifies three kinds of distinctions: real, mental, and modal. Real distinctions hold between things which have their own independent existence and can endure separation from each other without either thing ceasing to exist. Mental distinctions hold between things which are not actually distinct, but are only thought of as such because of incomplete mental concepts or ideas. Suarez introduces the concept of modality to address those distinctions which really exist but which cannot endure separation without one of the distinguished things ceasing to exist. Modal distinctions fill a key role in rationalizing identity.

Modes are not distinct things or entities in themselves. Rather, they are necessarily conjoined to and cannot possibly exist without the prior existence of the thing of which they are modes. They modify the thing to which they are attached, conferring some property to it which would not otherwise have adhered in the object, but they do not in adhering create any new object.

An example might be helpful. To begin with, assume that the independent existence of universals like “blackness” or “being oriented towards the cause of global justice” has been established by prior argumentation. Blackness really exists and is really distinct from, say, whiteness, but it is an abstract object, having no spacio-temporal existence in any conceivable state of affairs. When blackness finds instantiation in a distinct object like a U2 Special Edition iPod, the device’s black color is said to be a mode of the object. The existing object is modified by the adherence of the universal color in the particular MP3 player, but no new object called “iPod-black” or “this iPod’s black color” is created—thus no real distinction exists between black and iPod. The black color—not Blackness Itself, but this black in this object—is modally distinct from the iPod.

Modal distinctions contribute to our understanding of identity by providing a framework for understanding how universal properties can inhere in particular objects. If we wish to consider the identity of the object we hold to be our iPod, we would of course wish to keep our reflections as simple as possible without multiplying needlessly the entities under consideration. We would not want, upon realizing that our iPod looks black, to divorce “black” from “iPod” and christen the color a new object to be identified. Not only would identity quickly become an unapproachable jumble of concepts (portable MP3 player, hard, shiny, U2-endorsed, etc.), but it would not be clear how properties could possibly inhere in the object under consideration. If each property were a distinct object in itself, we would find ourselves bereft of any means of claiming that the iPod actually held properties; instead it would have some dubious relation to independent objects like “black” or “having been signed by The Edge.” However, if we hold properties to be modes of the object, the object’s identity becomes not just more graspable by the metaphysician, but also a real ground to differentiate it from other objects.

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• Posted by Tim on Friday, January 6, 2006 at 1:26:20 pm PST
• Category: School, Philosophy
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